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Abstract  
 
It is our contention that when designing against terrorism, it is important to fully understand both 
terrorist perpetrator techniques and terrorism prevention principles and to establish the myths and 
realities about ‘fear of terrorism’, before catalyzing new design innovations. This paper assesses the 
requirement for designers to mediate issues of user liberty versus security. We assess the troublesome 
design tradeoffs between accommodation of users and exclusion of terrorist misuse and abuse linked to 
bicycle parking, using the Conjunction of Terrorism Opportunity framework.  We include the case 
study of the Biceberg automated bike parking system in relation to the fitness for purpose versus 
resistance to terrorism debate. 
 
When working on the design of secure street parking, our research revealed that ‘fly 
parked’ bikes are regularly removed by the police from locations thought to be high-
risk terrorist targets. ‘Fly parking’ needs further definition and is coined by Adam 
Thorpe of Bikeoff to describe the securing of bicycles to street furniture not intended 
for that purpose, i.e. railings, lamp-posts, parking meters, benches, street signs and so 
on (Gamman et al. 2004). It demarcates the user desires of cyclists as regards parking 
provision in a similar fashion to the way desire lines (footpaths worn in grass by 
people avoiding the prescribed routes and taking shortcuts) demarcate the way people 
wish to move through their environment. Fly parking is a consequence of user demand 
for proximity to destination and often should be viewed not as ‘nuisance’ behaviour by 
cyclists, but connected to lack of adequate provision by the authorities.  
Our research has revealed that since the Bognor and Brighton bike bombs, fly parked 
and other bikes are regularly removed by police in Westminster, London from 
locations thought to be attractive to terrorist acts. For example, bikes were banned 
from Parliament Square (London, June 2006), removed and regularly impounded 
when parked in the proximity of the Labour Party conference in Brighton September 
2005: 
Bicycles are being removed to avoid a repeat of the IRA bike bomb blast in Bognor 
on August 13, 1994. A bomb hidden in a bag on a bicycle chained to railings in the 
town centre detonated, causing damage to shops but no injuries. Police found 
another bike chained up near the Palace Pier in Brighton with 5lbs of Semtex 
hidden in a saddlebag but carried out a controlled explosion before it could go off. 
If it had detonated it would have killed anybody within a 46 metre radius.  Over the 
next few weeks bicycles left chained up near the Brighton Centre could be removed 
and taken to a police pound.  During the conference, police will aim to stop cyclists 
before they have time to chain their machines to the fences.  Sergeant Pete Hutin 
said: ‘We have removed quite a lot of bikes over the last year and it has been a 
challenge reuniting them with their owners.’ There is no defined zone where bikes 
are not allowed but those with saddle bags or panniers parked near the conference 
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centre are certain to be investigated by the police and could be removed. (The 
Argus 2005) 
 
This policing strategy is not an over reaction.  Bike parking sites are attractive to 
terrorists. This is not a fictional assessment or our personal assertion. “It was a remote 
controlled bike bomb on the roadside which targeted a Ministry of Interior police bus “ 
(Kabul, October 11, 2006). There are many similar press reports about bike bombs that 
can be easily accessed via the web, which also offers access to a 3 min video clip of 
the streetscape outside of Yishun MRT train station, Singapore, seen through the eyes 
of a terrorist. It features the voice of Hashim bin Abas. Bin Abas reviews bike parking 
from the point of view of someone looking for a place to plant a bomb. The videotape 
was recovered from Afghanistan and led to his arrest for hostile reconnaissance/ 
terrorist activities. On this tape (transcript is available on Channel News Asia website 
(Channel News Asia 2007) Bin Abas says:  
‘You will notice that some of the boxes placed on the motorcycles, these are the same 
type of boxes that we intend to use. ‘  
 
The camera pans across the bicycle stands to motorcycle racks and other parking 
facilities and the voice continues: ‘This is a taxi stand, our bicycle can be parked there 
also; either bicycle or motorcycle. This is a view of the pickup point from the rear, 
there is a tree next to the bicycle bay, this is the place where the military personnel 
will alight from the bus or queue up for the bus.’ The use of bike bombs is a known 
urban terrorist MO. In recent years, linked to conflict and insurgency in the Middle 
East, there are many examples where bike bombs have been used to kill soldiers as 
well as civilians and create terror in Afghanistan (Command Post 2007, Scotsman 
2007, Deutsche Welle 2007), Pakistan (Dawn 2006, China Daily 2007) and more 
recently Baghdad (Peoples Daily Online 2007). We include press reports in the 
endnotes for further analysis. Clearly, the policing strategy in relation to cycle parking 
on London’s streets is intended to address, via social policy, what Roach et al. (2005) 
in their account of the conjunction of terrorist opportunity (CTO), locate as crucial 
principles to avoid terrorism i.e. ‘restricting the resources available to the terrorist; 
excluding terrorists from the situation; and promoting ‘deterrence’ via situational 
interventions deployed to ‘raise the perceived risk of getting caught or failure for 
terrorists.’ 
 
In relation to cycle usage in cities ‘troublesome tradeoffs’ (Ekblom 2005) between 
designing to promote the benefits of cycle usage and designing to reduce the threat of 
terrorism are glaringly apparent.  
 
We note that: ‘It is estimated that up to 1,600 people can die prematurely each year 
due to health problems caused by breathing London’s polluted air.’ (Mayor of London 
2002).
 
So it may be argued that the risk associated with bike bombs is superseded by 
that of traffic pollution. Additionally, the pollution threat is discriminate in that it 
directly affects the most vulnerable, ‘children, older people and those with heart and 
lung problems.’ 
 
It is already established that ‘most [air] pollution in London comes from road traffic’, 
the major contributor being the ‘11 million car journeys made [in London] every day’. 
The Mayor of London’s Air Quality Strategy (2002) identifies increased cycle usage 
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as part of the solution to this lethal problem. He advocates measures aimed ‘to help 
staff to walk, cycle or use public transport to get to work; for example by putting in 
cycle racks and showers’.  
 
Desirable as it is to eradicate the threat of bike bombs from our cities, deterring 
cycling by banning cycle parking in busy locations (considered high risk) cannot be 
the answer given the benefits of cycling in relation to health and quality of life issue. 
The issue of ‘risk’, discussed at length by Durodié (2005) needs to be carefully 
understood and reviewed. Indeed, if the benefits of bike use are more significant for 
daily commuters than the threat of terrorism how far should anti terrorist thinking 
influence or impede the design, context and availability of bicycle parking? 
 
We believe the above question is the crux regarding the design of anti terrorist 
objects/ environments for public space. To address the tradeoffs that inevitably arise, 
we advocate a rigorous assessment of the design conflicts and confluences between 
security and user requirements. 
 
Liberty versus Security – Assessment of conflicts and confluences of cycle 
parking user requirements and terrorist misuse. 
 
1. In the security corner… 
 
When considering Roach et al’s Conjunction of Terrorist Opportunity Framework 
(2005) in relation to public cycle parking, seven of the principles are particularly 
useful for identifying areas of conflict between user requirements and measures 
necessary to deter or prevent terrorism. 
 
A definition of terms, abbreviated from Roach et al.’s (2005) original text is necessary 
to appreciate how these principles relate to situational terrorism prevention through 
design: 
 
1.1. Excluding terrorists from the situation 
‘Excluding suspects from places within a country … (e.g. injunctions to stop suspected 
animal rights activists from going near the homes of pharmaceutical company 
employees)’ may be an appropriate consideration in relation to cycle parking. Those 
individuals considered to be high risk being denied access to sites considered high 
risk.’ 
 
1.2. Deterrence 
‘Raises the perceived risk of getting caught or failure for terrorists; discouragement 
makes the terrorist think that the effort to commit the act is too great for the reward. 
On the situational side are a range of familiar techniques to: increase the effort for the 
terrorist, increase the risk, reduce the reward, reduce provocations, remove excuses and 
enhance empathy.’  
 
1.3. Target vectors 
Target vectors are the immediate targets of terrorist action. Terrorist engagement with 
the target vector is a means to an end. The action on the target vector is not the end in 
itself but the mechanism by which to deliver a message to a broader audience. 
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‘Interventions that prevent people and things becoming target vectors will be largely 
situational.’ For example ‘The use of the twin towers in New York by Al Quaeda as a 
target vehicle (and the concern about nuclear power-plants becoming targets) has led to 
the introduction of many situational prevention measures’ such as ‘Construction of 
buildings that are not head and shoulders above the rest’ Ekblom notes: ‘ But there is 
again a trade-off between being prudent versus giving some kind of surrender message 
to target audience and the enemy’. Consideration of the bicycle in an urban context as 
a target vector is appropriate as the banning of bicycles from public spaces, due to the 
threat of terrorist misuse, may deliver the message that the benefits of bicycle usage are 
denied those who are in conflict with terrorists. It is important to consider the range of 
situational prevention measures that may prevent bicycles becoming target vectors. It 
is also important to be wary of the possibility that a ban on parked bicycles in high risk 
areas may send a surrender message. 
 
1.4. Target enclosure 
‘Well-established techniques such as target hardening and access control used to 
modify situations to prevent crime are applicable to preventing acts of terrorism.  
Multi-layered target enclosures and associated access control (the onion skin 
approach) can confer defence in depth.’ 
 
1.5. The wider environment 
‘Changes which make the environment less attractive, less likely to generate offending 
or less logistically/tactically favourable for offenders.’ Interventions may be local in 
focus and may involve changes in the design and management of facilities and 
locations. ‘Areas containing specific national icons may attract terrorist attention; so 
may require broad protection via surveillance, redesign of road layouts, access points 
etc.’ 
 
1.6. Boosting preventers (including capable guardians) 
Preventers are people who may make terrorism less likely to occur or make it harder 
for a terrorist to succeed. 
‘This can be through formal control (e.g. increased security patrolling, surveillance, 
intelligence-gathering and investigation, and the acquisition/placement of informants 
[site managers, guardians of targets]) or informal social control (e.g. increased 
employee and public vigilance).’ 
 
1.7. Discouraging or deterring terrorist promoters 
Promoters are people who may make terrorism more likely to occur or make it easier 
for a terrorist to succeed. Promoters can be considered to be deliberate or careless. 
In relation to bicycle parking an address to careless promoters is appropriate. 
‘Measures against careless promoters can include anything from reminding people to 
lock doors or take their bags when leaving trains...[or parked bikes]’ 
 
2. In the user corner… 
 
When considering the design of cycle parking provision, there are a number of key 
design drivers that prescribe ‘fitness for purpose’. Design of an appropriate facility, 
likely to meet user requirements, and therefore encourage optimum usage, must 
consider the following issues that we have extrapolated from existing cycle parking 
design guidelines and Bikeoff research.
1
 
 5 
 
 
2.1. Length of stay 
Short stay (<2 hours), medium stay (2-6 hours), long stay (6+ hours). Short stay 
should be located within 25 metres of the destination it is to serve. Longer stay 
requires greater security from theft and can be located up to 50 metres from the 
destination it is to serve. 
 
2.2. Location 
Should reflect user desires. Fly parking is a good indicator of demand. 
For cycle parking to be attractive to users it should be located 25-50 metres from the 
destination it is to serve. 
 
2.3. Layout. 
Sites serving multiple destinations should be provided parking in small clusters of 
stands (<6). Sites serving single larger destinations should be placed together in 
adequate numbers. Layout should consider sight lines to facilitate easy monitoring of 
stands. 
 
2.4. Spacing 
Should allow easy use of parking and circulation of users. 
 
2.5. Access 
Should be easy for cyclists on and off their bikes and avoid conflicts with other users 
of the space and its approaches. Long stay parking or site-specific parking (e.g. 
workplace) may consider controlled access. 
 
2.6. Guardianship, Surveillance and Lighting. 
Parking should be well lit such that monitoring and use is facilitated. Those personnel 
monitoring the surveillance and those providing guardianship should be informed and 
empowered as to potential threats to the security of the facility and its users. Such 
measures should consider the approaches to the parking as well as parking itself. 
 
2.7. Maintenance and servicing equipment should be low maintenance. Servicing is 
necessary to signal a secure, well-managed facility and is likely to be attractive to 
users. 
 
2.8. Signage 
Should be clear and instructive to all languages and should inform users as to the most 
appropriate usage of the facility. 
 
2.9. Charges are only appropriate on long stay parking where security is highly 
considered. 
 
2.10. Scales of Provision. Scale should reflect demand and allow for expansion. Fly 
parking is a good indicator of demand. 
 
Once user requirements and CTO principles are defined their cross consideration may 
assist designers in identifying the areas of conflict between ‘fitness for purpose’ and 
resistance to terrorist misuse or abuse. 
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A table illustrating cross comparison of these CTO principles and cycle parking 
design requirements is featured at the end of the article (Figure 8). It assists the 
designer in identifying the troublesome tradeoffs and convenient correlations between 
user requirements and the techniques that deter terrorism.  Having determined these 
conjunctions, knowledge of terrorist MOs is required to enable the designer to 
understand how to mediate, reducing conflicts and amplifying confluences. 
 
3. Summary of conflicts and confluences  
A summary of these conflicts and confluences, within design of cycle parking, can be 
stated as follows:  
 
3.1. Length of stay is a high conflict consideration as cyclists require the option to 
leave their bikes parked, and unattended, for whatever length of time they desire.  
This pattern of usage provides cover for terrorists as it legitimises the presence of 
unattended bikes. One confluence is that users of ‘long stay’ parking require greater 
security, including controlled access, surveillance and guardianship. Thus long stay 
facilities provide good opportunities to design “against terrorism” without user 
conflict. 
 
3.2. Location is a high conflict consideration. Research shows that for short stay cycle 
parking to be used it should be located within 25m of the destination served and 50m 
for long stay parking (Sustrans 2004). The lethal blast radius of 5lb of Semtex (as 
hidden within a saddle bag in Brighton in 1994) is 46 meters. Thus, the user 
requirement for parking to be close to the destination it serves is problematic, 
especially at iconic sites that may attract terrorist attention.   
 
By reviewing the above standards, we clearly identify that it is undesirable to users 
and sustainable transport objectives for the authorities to adopt a strategy that involves 
removal of bikes from the location (as in Westminster, London), and creates 
‘exclusion zones’ for cyclists.
2
 A thorough analysis of terrorist MOs, in pursuit of 
mediation of this conflict, is necessary, and in our opinion, reveals that in the vast 
majority of cases, explosives are NOT concealed in the bike itself but in bags placed 
on the bikes, and we include numerous press accounts in our endnotes in support of 
this assertion (Davenport 2006, Dawn 2006, Scotsman 2007). Therefore, it may be 
appropriate, in cases where ‘short stay’ parking is desirable, to address risks of 
terrorism by removing bags on bikes (rather than bikes) from the high risk locations. 
 
Proximity to destination the bicycle parking serves does offer some anti-terrorism 
benefits in that it may boost preventers by appropriating guardianship from personnel 
at the destination served. It is necessary for these guardians to be alerted, motivated, 
and empowered to be effective. Again ‘long stay’ facilities are most compatible with 
anti-terrorist considerations as these facilities acknowledge a user requirement for 
guardianship.  
 
3.3. Layout can easily be modified to benefit users and deter terrorist misuse and 
abuse by offering improved sight lines that deter concealment (of terrorist surveying 
opportunity, planting bomb, and bomb itself) and facilitate surveillance. Also by 
ensuring access for security equipment (bomb disposal) should the need arise.  
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3.4. Spacing. Similar concerns to layout are apparent; spacing can readily 
accommodate anti-terrorist considerations. 
 
3.5. Access.  ‘Short stay’ and smaller facilities generally allow and require free and 
easy access that is problematic from security perspectives. Long stay facilities may 
warrant greater investment in access security and may readily accommodate 
controlled, surveyed and recorded access of benefit to both the security of users and 
their bikes and terrorism prevention. 
 
3.6. Guardianship/ surveillance/ lighting is a factor of high confluence with terrorism 
prevention. Appropriate training and education of guardians will provide formal 
preventers. Deployment of appropriate technology (sniffers/ digital recognition/ 
Video Content Analysis) will aid formal preventers. 
 
3.7. Maintenance of a facility and its security systems signals quality of management 
and surveillance.   A well-managed facility will deter terrorists and attract users. 
Clean facilities, clear of obstruction, whilst of benefit to users, may also remove 
possible concealment for bags or bombs left unattended. 
 
3.8. Signage offers a great opportunity for terrorism prevention by recruiting informal 
preventers amongst users and the public via messaging such as: ‘Please report any 
bags left on bikes.’  Also by instructing legitimate users to avoid usage that may 
provide ‘cover’ for terrorist MOs i.e. messaging such as ‘Do not leave any bags, 
panniers or containers on your bike’. 
 
3.9. Charges benefit prevention of terrorism as payment facilities often require some 
form of registration and access control. Charges usually denote greater security.  
Payment for usage may also finance security interventions. 
 
3.10. Scale. Whilst there is a minimal risk that large-scale facilities may become 
targets for terrorism, it is also true that larger facilities allow for centralisation of 
resources and justify implementation of the measures listed above. 
 
In brief, after analysing the above user requirements and CTO principles it is our view 
that an appropriate anti-terrorist bike parking facility may be described as;  
 
i) Large scale with convenient and controlled access (possibly with a fee charged),  
ii) Well managed, lit and maintained; and  
iii) Regularly surveyed by appropriate informed and empowered guardians.  
iv) The design of the site should facilitate good surveillance (sight lines) and deny 
opportunities for concealment.   
v) Ideally, the parking should be situated within a robust enclosure (to contain an 
explosion should the worst happen).  
vi) Layout and spacing should facilitate easy observation and access for security 
equipment as well as users. 
vii) Signage should communicate with users as to appropriate usage i.e. ‘no bags to be 
left on bikes’, ‘please report any bags left on bikes’.   
viii) Long-term facilities can readily accommodate these requirements. Short-term 
facilities will find it harder to implement these measures but in high risk areas should 
consider the principles above and apply them where possible. 
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ix) All facilities should prohibit bags or other containers being left unattended on 
bikes in parking facilities. 
 
Having identified where the conflicts lay, an understanding of terrorist MOs  
(perpetrator techniques) may enable designers to mediate these conflicts within their 
proposals. And thus we would argue one of the best means of equipping designers to 
design against terrorism would be to make sure these perpetrator techniques are 
documented and understood, Paul Ekblom has argued (in conversation with us) for 
much more in depth analysis of criminal perpetrator techniques and scripts, and we 
would make the same case regarding terrorist MOs.
3
 
 
Also other questions need to be addressed.  Why would the terrorist, of all the objects 
in the urban environment to choose from, select a bike as their bomb carrier? Is the 
bike park close to a high risk target? Is a bike the only thing that can get close to the 
target and be left unattended? Are other potential carriers subjected to searches or 
authorisation? It is appropriate to ask these questions first as it may be that the need 
for an address to terrorism at all is unnecessary, given risk analysis of context, or that 
the context warrants even greater consideration of terrorism deterrence. 
 
In relation to the Westminster parked bike parking ban described earlier, a review of 
terrorist MOs related to bike bombs, reveals that the majority of bicycle bombs are 
located within bags on bikes rather than in the bike frames themselves. In fact we 
have been unable to identify bike bombs integrated into the bike frame, with the 
exception of N. Ireland in the 1970s (Bowden 1976). There is not sufficient 
information on record to detail the impact of this MO. We do know however that all 
other terrorist interventions using ‘bike bombs’ have located the explosive device 
within a bag or other container on the bike. This is significant. It indicates the bike 
frame does not offer easy accommodation of terrorist intentions. This is significant in 
terms of policy about bike parking. It prescribes an intermediate action between 
removing bikes from the scenario, at a cost to quality of life issues (including 
convenience, environment and health) and that of no-response to the potential terrorist 
risk presented by parked bicycles and their accessories. 
 
Clearly we should not be complacent about the risks of terrorists using bombs 
integrated into bikes in public places. We are well aware that terrorists are what 
Ekblom (1997) describes as ‘adaptive criminals’ so that ‘displacement’ of the terrorist 
bomb from bag to bike frame may occur in a short space of time. 
 
We would advocate that knowledge of terrorist MOs be continually re-appraised to 
empower designers to keep up with the ‘adaptive’ terrorist. Indeed, where possible 
designers and their expert advisors should seek to outmanoeuvre the terrorist threat by 
designing against risk prior to its occurrence (in this instance perhaps via the design or 
urban bicycles or cycle lockers that would contain a blast). However, we must be 
wary to avoid ‘scientific and technical [or design] developments where we 
increasingly elevate risk over opportunity’ (Durodie 2002) at a cost to quality of life 
and user freedoms. Designers and cycle parking providers should avoid what Durodie 
(2002) describes as ‘vulnerability-led’ responses. These tend to focus more on 
speculative ‘What if’ type questions - particularly emphasizing low incidence/ high 
consequence scenarios… at the expense of realistic ‘What will?’ and ‘What has?’ type 
evidence.  
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We also tend to agree with Hille Koskela's (2002) who in her account of ‘tolerance 
versus prejudice’ states ‘it is sometimes worth taking a risk in relation to security 
when considered against quality of life issues given that ‘hard solutions' faint [fade?] 
over time.’ 
 
Preventing cyclists from parking easily by applying bicycle exclusion zones, or bike 
parking restrictions, is also not the only troublesome tradeoff we need to think 
through regarding anti terrorist design strategies. Cycling has recently become a ‘hot’ 
political topic, not least because of the success of sustainable transport discourses. 
There are more cyclists on the road in London resulting from measures such as 
congestion charging, and some argue because of the bombing of the London 
Underground on 7 July 2006, which catalysed a 400% increase in cycle sales in the 
capital in the weeks that followed.
4
 
 
The relationship of the bike to such discourse has been ‘heightened’ or to use Innes 
(2004) account has been ‘signalled’ and therefore could easily become a symbolic 
terrorist target. When considering why a bicycle would become a terrorist vector 
situational considerations may not be the only motivating factors. The potential to 
embarrass the authorities and scupper their attempts at developing more sustainable 
transport options needs to be considered too. Perhaps the ultimate troublesome 
tradeoff is between the negative impact upon ‘on street’ cycle parking provision that 
would inevitably ensue should a terrorist using a bike bomb ‘succeed’ occur and the 
measures necessary to prevent this occurrence. A terrorist success in using a bike 
bomb may lead to over-reaction by the authorities and circumvention of the 
requirement for cycle parking to be freely and readily available to users to promote 
urban cycling whilst over determination of measures to prevent this scenario may 
themselves deter cycle usage. 
 
 
2. Biceberg – A Cycle Parking Case Study 
 
To consider these troublesome tradeoffs in practice we offer a review of ‘Biceberg’ an 
innovative urban cycle parking solution, designed and used in Spain. 
 
The Biceberg
5
 underground parking system is automated. It collects bikes from, and 
returns them to street level (Figure 1). It comes in different model sizes able to store 
46 bikes, 69 bikes or 92 bikes. In addition to bike storage, the space provided for the 
bike by the Biceberg can also be used to store accessories such as a helmet, backpack 
or even a laptop (Figure 2). 
 
Insert Figure 1. here 
Insert Figure 2. here 
 
When we asked a number of police officers to review the system for London (we 
featured a model of it at the Reinventing the Bikeshed exhibition
6
 during the London 
Architectural Biennale, we were surprised that all those officers who spoke with us 
mentioned their concerns about possible terrorist abuse.
7
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The Biceberg system was first conceived in 1994 by Jaime Palacios and his company 
MA-Sistemas, S.L. It was further developed in 2003 to an operational standard, and 
has now been installed in six locations in Spain (Figure 3). In 2006, we understand 
from the designer, there were several expressions of interest in using the system from 
other European countries, including France and Denmark. 
The exterior housing for the automated system, shown below, is located at ground 
level. 
  
Insert Figure 3. here 
      
The see-through ‘casing’ has been designed using laminated toughened glass to 
maintain transparency. Much thought has gone into the design of the machine in 
regard to technological ease of use, aesthetics and information design in relation to 
providing a user-friendly experience. The first point where the cyclist interacts with 
the machine, is consequently easy on to the eye as well as to the user (Figure 4). 
 
Insert Figure 4. here 
 
It provides easy-to-understand messaging when users interact with the computer 
screen to access the bike storage. User-centred detailing such as the groove in which 
to stand the cycle, next to the machine before loading is clearly thought through and 
again easy to use (Figure 5). 
 
Insert Figures 5. here 
 
The system works by storing bikes in individual underground container segments, 
(like slices of a circular cake) forming carousels. The different model sizes (46, 69 
and 92 bikes), are attained via deployment of a modular system which comes in 
carousel stacks of 23 bikes per level, as can be seen from the images below taken 
inside the store area (Figures 6 a and b). 
 
Insert Figures 6. a and b here 
 
The user carries out these operations using a chipped smartcard and enters a secret 
personal code, in a process comparable to using an ATM (Figure 7).  
 
Insert Figure 7. here 
 
Waiting time and interface are also similar to that of an ATM. It is estimated that 
loading or accessing a bike for storage or retrieval takes 25 to 30 seconds. First time 
users will need a little longer to get used to the system. The ‘smart cards’ are the key 
to accessing the facility and retain details about the user on a central database that 
monitors patterns of use. Six cameras, built-in to the installation, monitor what is 
introduced to and retrieved from the storage units. The video cameras are activated 
specifically when someone inserts or removes objects via the system. Upon loading 
the bike into the machine the contents are also weighed, to further confirm what has 
been entered or removed (to check it conforms to usual bike weights) and to prevent, 
for example, a child or a person (drunk ‘stag night’ attendee for instance) being 
inappropriately loaded into the bike park. The system also currently integrates 
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equipment for the detection of any living beings or species introduced - this works via 
a combination of infrared and microwave technologies.  
 
The key strengths of the system, from a user perspective, include the fact that 
Biceberg offers space sensitive underground parking that can contain extra mobile 
objects (helmets, bags) as well as bikes. Also, on street, the housing offers exhibition 
or advertising potential for the promotion of cycling. Its SmartCard and Pass-Code 
controlled access system means that users have exclusive access to their own property 
and that it is relatively safe from theft at any the of day or night. 
 
Concerns in relation to fitness for purpose are limited to the fee paying aspect and 
multi-user access at times and locations of peak usage. Installation of several smaller 
(46 bikes) as opposed to one larger (96 bikes) facility would go some way to resolving 
this issue. 
 
Despite this positive user review security experts to whom we showed the Biceberg 
system, prioritised concerns about bombs being planted by terrorists in bags or on 
bikes, who were imagined to be able to gain access by stealing smart cards or 
obtaining them in false names. We identified from the start that the design of the 
underground concrete bunker, which forms part of the pre-fabricated structure, in 
which bike are stored could protect the public from the worst of any potential bomb 
blast at street level linked to terrorist activity, but this fact did not alleviate their 
concerns. 
 
When we raised these issues with the owner/ designer James Palacious, his first 
response (when interviewed by Marcus Willcocks in Barcelona 2006) was to say that 
adding explosive detecting sensors wasn’t impossible in design terms, just entirely 
‘unnecessary.’ He argued that the system already had enough ‘defensiveness 
‘designed into it via password protected, smart card access control systems, and 
CCTV, to be safe. ‘Yes’ the system could be adapted further to include explosive 
detection, but the owner thought it pointless unless ordered by direct customer 
specification. Also the extra costs of this added security could, in his opinion, be 
prohibitive for the majority of customers.  
 
When viewed in relation to the design recommendations identified in the above cross 
comparison of user requirements and CTO principles, the Biceberg appears to us to be 
a highly appropriate solution for cycle parking in certain areas, currently considered to 
be at high risk of terrorism. We can see that it would work well in certain contexts, (if 
not all) even in cities like London that are regularly on high security alert, with one 
provision. When considering Biceberg in relation to its robustness to terrorist misuse 
or abuse, the feature which the manufacturer considers to be one of its key user 
benefits, is in our opinion, one of its greatest weakness, i.e. the ability and 
encouragement to store bags as well as bikes.  The above analysis prescribes that 
storage of the bags or other items capable of concealing explosives must be denied. 
This is a serious claim, and means that in using a strong theoretical framework, the 
CTO framework, to create an informed opinion about a design, we can balance the 
opinions derived from expert review, and identify that the real issue linked to terrorist 
misuse or abuse, and use is counter intuitive. Rather than Biceberg being a likely 
terrorist facilitator it could in fact be a good cycle parking solution in high risk areas. 
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Conclusion 
 
Cycling is good, bombs are bad. And bombs in bags on bikes are more common than 
bombs integrated into bike frames (so far...). In the context of fears about bike bombs, 
we should not negate the opportunities for increased cycle usage via restriction of 
provision of on street cycle parking, for fear of creating opportunities for terrorist 
misuse and abuse. However, as the threat of bike bombs is not entirely delusional we 
must, where possible, design against them in an appropriate and proportionate 
manner. To do this requires the designer to i) identify areas of design conflict and 
confluence between liberty and security (i.e. sites of conflict/confluence between use 
and misuse/abuse), ii) where conflict or confluence exists an address to both user 
freedom and exclusion of terrorism is appropriate. iii) At such conjunctions it is 
essential that the designer mediates between security and liberty, accessing sufficient 
knowledge and metrology by which to consider levels of risk and thus action 
appropriate and proportionate response. At all times, designs for exclusion of 
terrorism should be covert and clandestine so as to avoid promoting fear of terror 
through their design language; to avoid the design itself becoming what Innes (2004) 
would refer to as a ‘crime [or terrorist] signal’ or Roach et al. (2005) describe as a 
‘vector’. 
 
Ultimately, we agree with Frank Furedi (2002) who argues against a ‘culture of fear’, 
and also Bill Durodié  (2002) who warns against over-reaction from the authorities, 
and states the need to develop responses based on clear values rather than focussing 
on vulnerabilities.  
 
To paraphrase Durodié: ‘To restore some balance [within the user liberty versus 
security debate] demands acting calmly [or designing calmly] confidently, and above 
all rationally.’ 
 
If we are to benefit from design opportunities, spanning troublesome tradeoffs 
between security and user requirements with ingenuity, rather than suffering the 
consequences of ‘vulnerability-led’ responses, designers must embrace what John 
Thackara (2005) has described as ‘design mindfulness’. We must also heed Benjamin 
Franklin’s warning that ‘Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a 
little Temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.’
8
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Figure 8. Cross comparison of CTO principles and cycle parking design requirements 
 
Key: 
-  = conflict 
+ = confluence 
0 = no relation 
 
 
 
 Exclusion Deterrence Vectors Enclosure Environment Preventers Promoters 
Length of stay - - - -/+ - 0 - 
 Cannot limit 
presence 
Legitimises 
presence of 
unattended 
object 
A bike is 
generally 
innocuous a 
symbol of free 
to stay where it 
likes as long as 
it likes.  
Short stay/ easy 
use doesn’t 
allow for 
enclosure. 
Long stay can 
require 
enclosure and 
access control 
Legitimises 
presence of 
unattended 
object for 
period of time 
 Short stay users 
are less likely 
to remove bags 
and containers 
thus becoming 
careless 
promoters  
Location - - - + - + 0 
 <25m means  Proximity to 
target could 
increase 
rewards 
Bikes can go 
anywhere as 
they are 
perceived to be 
no threat. 
Despite 
location 
parking can be 
physically 
enclosed to 
contain blast 
High risk due 
to proximity to 
destination – 
particularly at 
iconic sites that 
may attract 
terrorist 
attention which 
may warrant 
special 
consideration 
Proximity to 
destination 
served may 
allow for 
acquisition of 
personnel at 
destination to 
serve as 
preventers 
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 Exclusion Deterrence Vectors Enclosure Environment Preventers Promoters 
Layout + + 0 0 + + - 
 Enable 
observation 
Enable 
observation 
and increase 
risk of getting 
caught/being 
detected 
  Enable 
observation 
and access 
with bomb 
disposal 
equipment 
May facilitate 
preventers by 
enabling 
observation 
May conceal 
careless 
promoters by 
concealing 
their misuse  
Spacing +  + 0 0 + + + 
 Enable 
observation 
and access for 
security 
equipment and 
personnel 
Enable 
observation 
and access for 
security 
equipment and 
personnel 
  Enable 
observation 
and access 
with bomb 
disposal 
equipment 
May facilitate 
preventers by 
enabling 
observation 
May conceal 
careless 
promoters by 
concealing 
their misuse 
Access -/+ -/+ 0 -/+ -/+ -/+ 0 
 Restricted 
access could 
limit 
opportunity for 
terrorist access 
Restricted 
access could 
increase risk 
and effort for 
terrorist 
 Easy access 
denotes low 
enclosure. 
Restricted/ 
controlled 
access 
promotes 
enclosure 
Easy access 
attractive to 
terrorists. 
Restricted/ 
controlled 
access less 
attractive 
Easy access 
may 
inconvenience 
formal 
preventers by 
making it 
harder to 
identify 
legitimate 
users. 
Restricted/ 
recorded 
access assists 
formal 
preventers 
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 Exclusion Deterrence Vectors Enclosure Environment Preventers Promoters 
Guardianship/ 
Surveillance/ 
Lighting 
+  + - + + + + 
 Informed 
personnel 
could watch 
out for terror 
MOs and 
record access 
Staffed 
facilities with 
restricted and 
recorded 
access could 
increase risk 
and effort for 
terrorist 
Targeting of a 
secure facility 
would 
demonstrate 
that no bike is 
safe. 
Staffed and 
surveyed 
facilities assist 
in target 
hardening  
Staffed and 
surveyed 
facilities will 
deter terrorists 
Capable 
guardians, 
motivated, 
informed and 
empowered are 
effective 
formal 
preventers. 
Appropriate 
lighting and 
surveillance 
assists formal 
preventers. 
Denies 
clandestine 
misuse of 
facility by 
careless 
promoters. 
Maintenance + + + 0 + + + 
 Informed 
personnel 
could watch 
out for terror 
MOs 
Informed 
personnel 
could increase 
risk and effort 
for terrorist 
Successful 
targeting of a 
well 
maintained 
facility would 
demonstrate 
that no bike is 
safe 
 
 Well 
maintained 
facility and 
security 
features could 
benefit users 
and deter 
terrorists  
Well 
maintained 
facility will 
assist formal 
preventers 
Well 
maintained 
facility will 
deter misuse of 
facility by 
careless 
promoters 
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 Exclusion Deterrence Vectors Enclosure Environment Preventers Promoters 
Signage + + 0 0 + +  
 Legitimate 
users could be 
requested to 
take action not 
associated with 
terrorist MOs 
Signage 
denying actions 
associated with 
terrorist MOs 
could increase 
risk and effort 
for terrorist 
  Signage 
denying actions 
associated with 
terrorist MOs 
will deter 
terrorists 
Facilitates 
formal 
preventers in 
identifying 
deviance. 
Facilitates 
informal 
preventers by 
requesting 
vigilance and 
reporting 
 
Excellent 
deterrent to 
careless 
promoters by 
warning against 
misuse that 
may provide 
cover for 
terrorist MOs 
Charges +  + 0 + + + 0 
 For long-term 
parking.  Could 
be designed to 
control access 
For long-term 
parking. Could 
control access 
and increase 
risk and effort 
for terrorist 
 Charge 
facilities for 
long term. 
Could control 
access and 
increase risk 
and effort for 
terrorist  
Charge 
facilities for 
long term. 
Could control 
access and 
deter terrorists 
also could pay 
for additional 
security 
measures 
 
 
Charge 
facilities for 
long term. 
Could control 
and record 
access aiding 
formal 
preventers  
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 Exclusion Deterrence Vectors Enclosure Environment Preventers Promoters 
Scale +/- -/+  - + -/+ -/+ - 
 Could enable 
centralise 
resources/ may 
become target 
due to volume 
of usage 
Could increase 
provocation 
due to location 
and size or 
could serve to 
centralise 
resources 
Large scale 
facility could 
increase 
provocation 
due to extent of 
potential 
impact 
Large scale 
allows 
centralisation 
of resources 
which would 
afford 
enclosure 
techniques 
Could increase 
provocation 
due to location 
and size or 
could serve to 
centralise 
resources 
Small scale is 
likely to rely on 
informal 
preventers. 
Large scale 
could centralise 
resources and 
facilitate formal 
preventers 
Large scale 
parking 
increases 
likelihood of 
careless 
promoters. 
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Notes 
 
                                                       
1 See: http://www.bpsa.info/intro.htm, 
http://www.camcycle.org.uk/resources/cycleparking/standards/city.html among many 
others from local councils (and downloadable from TfL and SRA) 
2 See: http://www.westminster.gov.uk. 
3 AHRC Bikeoff 2 project meeting between Design Against Crime Research Centre 
and Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, 24th January 2007.   
4 In conversation with Andrea Casalotti, proprietor of Velorution, 2005.  
5 The account herein of Biceberg is based on information supplied and drawn up by 
Gamman and Willcocks for Reinventing the Bike Shed exhibition, London 2006.  Full 
details about Biceberg feature exhibition included:  
Name of company: MA-Sistemas, S.L. Crtra.Nacional 330 km  647,500 Polígono 
Charlé-Calle 222700 Jaca -Huesca-SpainTel. + 34 974 357 07 Fax. + 34 974 357 074; 
Name of Architect/designer: Jaime Palacios;  
Supplier of parking equipment/ furniture: MA-sistemas, s.lL;  
Type of parking equipment/ furniture (e.g. Sheffield stand or Double parker): 
eAutomatic underground bike park;  
Location of installation(s) and facility/amenity it serves: Town centres, Transport 
interchanges, stations, University campuses, sports/ leisure centres etc;  
Cost (of installation/build - not use): 46 bikes - !120,000 euros, 69 bikes - !135,000 
euros, 92 bikes - !150,000 euros (based on costs installed in Spain);  
Number of bikes stored: 23, 46, 69 or 92 per unit (i.e.- each level of underground 
storage takes 23 bikes - like a carrousel);  
Length of stay the facility seeks to serve: short – medium - long term (most common 
use is medium – 1-8 hours) but overnight stay is possible;  
Service period (how long the facility is meant to last): approx. 25 years (with 
preventative and software update maintenance). 
6 See: www.reinventingthebikeshed.com 
7With thanks to many officers including Brian Howat, of British Transport Police 
Terry Cocks and Ike Gray of the Metropolitan Police, Camden. 
8 Those who would give up Essential Liberty to purchase a little Temporary Safety 
deserve neither Liberty nor Safety’, is an often misquoted phrase commonly attributed 
to Benjamin Franklin. The quote is taken from, ‘An Historical Review of the 
Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania,’ first published anonymously in 
London in 1759. The quote is an excerpt from a letter written in 1755 from the 
Assembly to the Governor of Pennsylvania. Benjamin Franklin did publish the edition 
printed in Philadelphia in 1812, and most likely the original, but denies writing any 
part of it. The quote, however, may have originated from Franklin and been excerpted 
for the book by the author. (Wikipedia 2007) 
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